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SYNOPSIS
Traditional hazard analysis techniques utilize a two-
dimensional representation of the results determined 
by relative likelihood and severity of the residual 
risk.  These matrices present a quick-look at the 
Likelihood (Y-axis) and Severity (X-axis) of the 
probable outcome of a hazardous event.  A three-
dimensional method, described herein, utilizes the 
traditional X and Y axes, while adding a new, third 
dimension, shown as the Z-axis, and referred to as the 
Level of Control.  The elements of the Z-axis are 
modifications of the Hazard Elimination and Control 
steps (also known as the Hazard Reduction 
Precedence Sequence).  These steps are:  1. Eliminate 
risk through design.  2. Substitute less risky materials 
for more hazardous materials.  3. Install safety 
devices.  4. Install caution and warning devices.  5. 
Develop administrative controls (to include special 
procedures and training.)  6. Provide protective 
clothing and equipment.  When added to the two-
dimensional models, the level of control adds a visual 
representation of the risk associated with the 
hazardous condition, creating a ‘tall-pole’ for the 
least-well-controlled failure while establishing the 
relative likelihood and severity of all causes and 
effects for an identified hazard.  Computer modeling 
of the analytical results, using spreadsheets and three-
dimensional charting gives a visual confirmation of 
the relationship between causes and their controls.
INTRODUCTION
Practitioners of System Safety methodology are 
inventive by nature.  In order to predict and control 
the risks of a new venture, the analyst must be able to 
identify the hazards that may be present, prescribe 
corrective actions, and provide some level of 
assurance that management has made the appropriate 
decision of safety versus acceptable risk.
Tools that may be used by System Safety analysts 
include the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) or Logic Model (LM), and
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA).  These 
methods are extremely detailed and, at times, very 
difficult for the uninitiated to understand.  At the 
completion of each phase of the analysis, 
management is apprised of the residual risks that 
have been identified.
It is at this time that the Safety Professional must 
stand and explain, in detail, the status of the analysis. 
It is also at this time that Safety Professionals usually 
step out of their comfort zone.  What is needed is a 
method, which utilizes the same ‘dog-and-pony’ 
techniques, which the managers are comfortable 
with…and familiar.
BACKGROUND
As soon as a new project is identified, managers 
begin to theorize what gains are to be made from the 
venture, and what risks are involved.  If a new, highly 
technical design is to be developed, such as a 
composite aircraft, a space shuttle, or robot, the call 
goes out for many varied and highly specialized 
technicians.  These technicians include engineers, 
designers, accountants, and Safety Professionals.
When the new project is sufficiently detailed to 
identify what its purpose is to be, the professionals 
perform initial analyses.  The engineers perform trade 
studies to identify the alternative methods or designs; 
the accountants perform risk assessments to 
determine what the marketability and return-on-
investment is likely to be; and the System Safety 
Professional performs a Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
(PHA). A checklist of Generic Hazards may be used 
to guide the creation of the PHA. A partial list is 
shown as Figure 1.
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20100024129 2019-08-30T09:49:31+00:00Z
Figure 1 Partial List of Generic Hazards
THE ANALYSIS PROCESS
The PHA, sometimes referred to as a Preliminary 
Hazard Screening, is the initial cut at identifying the 
hazards associated with a selected design or process.
The PHA may be presented in a tabular format like 
that shown in Figure 2.  As the analysis develops, 
Causes, Effects, Controls, and Verifications are 
added to the Hazardous Condition and Safety 
Requirements already identified in the earliest stages 
of analysis.  The Severity and Likelihood are usually 
the last elements to be added, based on the perceived 
outcome of the hazardous condition following the 
application of controls   the analysis may look like 
that in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 Preliminary Hazard Analysis
Following the selection of the ‘lowest-business-risk’ 
model, additional designs or processes are refined.  
This design-analyze-redesign sequence is critical for 
the Safety Professional.  It is at this point that the 
final controls are identified in order to reduce the risk 
to an acceptable level.  The Safety Professional 
knows that by performing a high quality analysis, the 
product is more likely to be successful and profitable.  
The Safety Professional should ‘lead the design’ as 
much as possible.  Identification of hazards late in the 
design phase is likely to result in costly redesign or 
cancellation of the venture if the perceived risk is too 
great.  Either of these outcomes may be embarrassing 
for all parties.
However, it happens.
One of the causes of such an unfortunate outcome
could be the lack of management understanding of 
the hazards involved.  This could be as a result of 
“Safety people talking to Safety people because no 
one else will talk to them.”  It is an all-too-often 
occurrence that the message regarding the residual 
risks may have been undersold.  A possible cause of 
this is the lack of management understanding of the 
risks due to an overwhelming amount of technical 
data thrown at a non-technical audience.  One of the 
methods used by the Safety Professional to reduce 
this ‘data overload’ is the use of Severity-to-
Likelihood matrices.  Figures 3 and 4 are examples of 
risk matrices.
Figure 3 Risk Matrix (3 X 4)
Figure 4 Constellation Program Risk Matrix (5 x 5)
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Note:  Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence without Controls In Place
Hazard Categorization
NASA’s Methodology for Conduct of Space Shuttle 
Program Hazard Analyses (NSTS 22254) provides 
the following definition of Severity Levels.
The severity level is an assessment of the most severe 
effects of a hazard. Complete for each cause (with the 
exception of those causes which transfer to other 
Hazard Reports) for all controls and verifications by 
assessing the most severe effect and documenting it 
as catastrophic, critical, or marginal.
(a) Catastrophic: Hazard could result in a 
mishap causing fatal injury to personnel 
and/or loss of one or more major 
elements of the flight vehicle or ground 
facility.
(b) Critical: Hazard could result in serious 
injury to personnel and/or damage to 
flight or ground equipment which 
would cause mission abort or a 
significant program delay.
(c) Marginal: Hazard could result in a 
mishap of minor nature inflicting
first−aid injury to personnel and/or 
damage to flight or ground equipment
which can be tolerated without abort or 
repaired without significant program 
delay.
The severity is plotted on the X axis as seen in Figure 
3.  The severity increases from left to right.
The Likelihood of Occurrence is an assessment of the 
most severe effects of a hazard transpiring. Complete 
for each cause (with the exception of those causes 
which transfer to other HR[s] for all controls and 
verifications) by assessing the controls that are in 
place and documenting them as probable, infrequent, 
remote, or improbable.
Likelihood is assessed considering the effectiveness 
of the controls in place for the life of the program.
(a) Probable: Expected to happen in the life 
of the program. If quantitative risk 
analyses are used to assist in likelihood 
determination, then for a cause to be 
considered probable, the single mission 
risk should have a mean probability 
greater than 1 in 200.
NOTE: In cases where the mean probability is 
less than 1 in 200, a cause may still be classified 
as probable once other factors, such as the level 
of uncertainty associated with the controls, are 
taken into account. Conversely, a mean 
probability of greater than 1 in 200 in itself 
should not automatically result in a cause being 
classified as probable if certainty in the controls 
provides a basis for not doing so.
(b) Infrequent: Could happen in the life of 
the program. Controls have significant 
limitations or uncertainties.
(c) Remote: Could happen in the life of the 
program, but not expected. Controls 
have minor limitations or uncertainties.
(d) Improbable: Extremely remote 
possibility that it will happen in the life
of the program. Strong controls in 
place.
The Likelihood is plotted as the Y axis, also shown in 
Figure 3 and increases from bottom to top.
Other reference documents utilize differing 
descriptions of the Severity and Likelihood; these are 
shown in Figures 5 and 6, representing the MIL-
STD-882 definitions of severity and probability.  For 
purposes of this paper, likelihood and probability are 
considered to be one and the same.
MIL-STD-882D has identified a set of mishap risk 
mitigation measures that identifies potential mishap 
risk mitigation alternatives and the expected 
effectiveness of each alternative or method. Mishap 
risk mitigation is an iterative process that culminates 
when the residual mishap risk has been reduced to a 
level acceptable to the appropriate authority. The 
system safety design order of precedence for 
mitigating identified hazards is:
a. Eliminate hazards through design 
selection. If unable to eliminate an identified
hazard, reduce the associated mishap risk 
to an acceptable level through design 
selection.
b. Incorporate safety devices. If unable to 
eliminate the hazard through design selection,
reduce the mishap risk to an acceptable 
level using protective safety features or 
devices.
c. Provide warning devices. If safety devices 
do not adequately lower the mishap risk of
the hazard, include a detection and 
warning system to alert personnel to the 
particular hazard.
d. Develop procedures and training. Where 
it is impractical to eliminate hazards through
design selection or to reduce the 
associated risk to an acceptable level 
with safety and warning devices, 
incorporate special procedures and 
training. Procedures may include the use 
of personal protective equipment. For 
hazards assigned Catastrophic or Critical 
mishap severity categories, avoid using 
warning, caution, or other written 
advisory as the only risk reduction 
method.
Figure 5 MIL-STD-882 Mishap Severity Definitions
Figure 6 MIL-STD-882 Mishap Probability Definitions
THE THREE-DIMENSIONAL DISPLAY 
PROCESS
Those same intuitive, inventive people who are called 
upon to perform hazard analyses are usually 
computer literate, either by desire or by requirements 
of the job.  A plethora of software has been 
developed for the offices of worldwide businesses.  
Along with it came an infusion of new techniques 
that may be used to visualize data.  It is not 
uncommon for the Safety Department to have high-
performance computers available to the Safety 
Professional. In most cases, the computers have
sophisticated software that aids in the analysis of 
hazards, generating charts, fault trees, tables, and 
other statistical reports.  This enables the sharing of 
data and transfer of corporate intelligence to a wide 
and diversified audience who may incorporate this 
information into new reports.
One of the most useful of the personal computer 
software packages is the database/spreadsheet. It is 
through the use of spreadsheets, including 
Microsoft’s Excel and Corel’s Quattro Pro and their 
ability to produce three-dimensional charts that the 
generation of the Three Dimensional Risk 
Assessment is made possible.
HAZARDOU
S
CONDITION
HAZARD
CAUSE
HAZARD
EFFECT
SEVERITY
LEVEL
SAFETY
REQUIREMENT
S
HAZARD
ELIMINATION 
/CONTROL
PROVISIONS VERIFICATIO
N
LIKELIHOOD OF 
OCCURRENCE
Low pressure 
vessel 
ruptures
a)  
Inadequate 
design
Destruction 
of vessel
Marginal –
hydro test 
will identify
Design to ASME 
Code
Qualified 
designer
Verified by 
independent 
engineer
Improbable
b) Common 
connection 
between hi 
and lo 
pressure 
supply
Destruction 
of vessel
Critical Systems shall not 
have 
interchangeable 
connections
Procedures 
require  relief 
valve
Relief valve 
inspection 
program
Remote
c) 
Inadequate 
Maintenance
Destruction 
of vessel; 
injury
Catastrophic Periodic cleaning, 
painting
Scheduled proof 
test
On plant 
inspection 
schedule
Infrequent
d) Vehicle 
collision
Destruction 
of vessel; 
injury
Catastrophic Vessel must be 
protected from 
traffic
Signs limiting 
traffic in vicinity
Monthly Safety 
Dept. 
inspection
Probable
e)  Relief 
valve fails
Destruction 
of vessel; 
injury
Catastrophic Install relief valve Relief valve 
annual testing
Maintenance 
Dept. testing
Improbable
Figure 7 Preliminary Hazard Analysis for a Pressure Vessel
In this example, the hazardous condition has been 
identified to have five potential causes. Each cause is 
lettered sequentially as a), b), c), d), or e).  The 
Hazard Elimination/Control Provisions are developed 
based on the best-available information, including 
safety requirements that are anticipated, or in place 
prior to project initialization.
Figure 8, below, adds a note in the Hazard 
Elimination/Control Provisions column to indicate 
the perceived Level of Control represented by the
controls.
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   Figure 8 Preliminary Hazard Analysis for a Pressure Vessel with Level of Control added
The elements of the Z-axis contained in the Three 
Dimensional Risk Representation are modifications 
of the Hazard Elimination and Control steps (also 
known as the Hazard Reduction Precedence 
Sequence).  These steps are:
0. Eliminate risk through design.
1. Substitute less risky materials for more 
hazardous materials.
2. Install safety devices. 
3. Install caution and warning devices.
4. Develop administrative controls (to include 
special procedures and training.)
5. Provide protective clothing and equipment. 
Figure 9 shows a typical screen from a Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheet that demonstrates the method of 
incorporating Severity, Likelihood, and Level of 
Control into a visual representation of the causes, the 
resultant risk, and the amount of control afforded to 
limiting the risk. In this table, the Level of Control is 
represented by the number, or level of control, of
each cause.
SEVERITY MARGINAL CRITICAL CATASTROPHIC
LIKELIHOOD
IMPROBABLE 0a 4e
REMOTE 2b
INFREQUENT 4c
PROBABLE 3d
Figure 9 Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet Screenshot
When converted to a three-dimensional view, the 
information contained in the spreadsheet generates 
the chart shown below.
Figure 10 Three-Dimensional View of Severity, Likelihood, and Level of Control
THE THREE-DIMENSIONAL 
REPRESENTATION
It is true that during a hazard analysis or assessment, 
the analyst will determine what the likelihood of a 
hazard will be and the outcome if it is uncontrolled.  
This two-dimensional process is plotted on a matrix 
where it can be visualized.  It is important that 
managers understand what they are viewing when a 
risk matrix is displayed.  It is unfortunate that the 
controls identified during the analysis may be lost 
during the visual and oral presentations.
When automated, the spreadsheet prepares a standard 
presentation style chart such as that shown in Figure 
10.  As demonstrated by the chart, the level of 
Severity increases from left-to-right; the Likelihood 
of Occurrence increases from front to back; and the 
Level of Control is displayed in such a manner as to 
raise the lowest control measure to the highest point 
on the Z axis – thereby producing the ‘tall-pole’.
A tall-pole in the left-front square may then be 
identified as a lower risk than a tall-pole in the right-
back corner.
It is at this point in the analysis that the Safety 
Professional can demonstrate that reducing the risk 
through judicious use of the Hazard Reduction 
Precedence Sequence will result in a lower 
programmatic risk and a safer system.  As controls 
are improved, the matrix can be modified to 
demonstrate a reduced level of exposure.
CONCLUSION
The Safety Professional has many tools available to 
assist in displaying the results of analyses.  
Traditional two-dimensional matrices have been used 
successfully for many years.  Today’s managers 
require easily understood presentations that 
demonstrate as much information as possible.  
Personal computers coupled with available software 
make this job easier.
With more information available at a glance, 
management has the opportunity to make business 
decisions that can improve the safety of the project 
under review, increase the profitability, and reduce 
costs of redesign at the earliest possible time.
PREPARED BY
CLIFFORD WATSON, CSP
NASA
 INTRODUCTION
 Traditional hazard analysis techniques utilize a two-dimensional 
representation of the results determined by relative likelihood and 
severity of the residual risk.  
 These matrices present a quick-look at the Likelihood (Y-axis) and 
Severity (X-axis) of the probable outcome of a hazardous event.  
 A three-dimensional method, described herein, utilizes the 
traditional X and Y axes, while adding a new, third dimension, 
shown as the Z-axis, and referred to as the Level of Control. 
 Tools Used by the Safety Analyst
 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) or Logic Model (LM)
 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
 These tools are detailed and may be difficult for uninitiated 
persons to understand
 System Safety analysts must be able to present the information 
developed by these tools to explain the results of these analyses
 Traditional tools are two-dimensional and present limited data from 
the analysis
 New projects require early analysis by System Safety
 Early techniques may begin with the Preliminary Hazard Analysis
 As an aid to the analyst, Generic Hazard Lists may be used
 Using the Generic Hazard List, the Safety Analyst prepares a 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
 PHAs are developed as the design advances; Hazardous 
Conditions are identified first, with Safety Requirements identified 
as basic controls.
 An early use of the PHA may be the identification of the “lowest-
business-risk” model
 Following this, redesign may be required
 Early identification of hazardous conditions, and the resultant re-design can be 
a substantial cost savings, since hardware hasn’t been built, or the use of 
‘boiler plate’ models is significantly less to manufacture
 Thus, the System Safety Engineer becomes an integral participant in the 
design-analyze-redesign sequence.
 System Safety should be involved as early as possible in the 
analysis of new systems, and may, in some cases, ‘lead’ the 
design
 Identification of uncontrollable hazards late in design and lead to 
cancellation of the project if the perceived risk is too high
 System Safety Engineers have the ability to address the hazards 
in a manner that is easy for Management to understand
 The selection of tools is important
 The most frequently used method of displaying relative risk is the 
Severity-Likelihood Matrix
 Matrices are frequently customized for the project
31
Unclassified – General Distribution5/1/2007 3:40:33 PM
Report on CxP Integrated Hazard Analyses
VERY LOW
LOW
MODERATE
HIGH
XVERY HIGH
CATASTROPHICCRITICALMARGINALMINORNEGLIGIBLE
SEVERITY
LI
K
EL
IH
O
O
D
Hazard Analysis Report INTG-US-GS-001                                  Page
CONSTELLATION  INTEGRATION  HAZARD  ANALYSIS  REPORT
Note:  Hazard Severity and Likelihood of Occurrence without Controls In Place
 NASA’s Methodology for Conduct of Space Shuttle Program 
Hazard Analysis (NSTS 22254) provides the following definition 
of Severity Levels
 Severity Levels
 (a)  Catastrophic: Hazard could result in a mishap causing fatal injury to 
personnel and/or loss of one or more major elements of the flight vehicle or 
ground facility
 (b)  Critical:  Hazard could result in serious injury to personnel and/or damage 
to flight or ground equipment which would cause mission abort or a significant 
program delay.
 (c)  Marginal:  Hazard could result in a mishap of minor nature inflicting first-aid 
injury to personnel and/or damage to flight or ground equipment which can be 
tolerated without abort or repaired without significant program delay.
 Severity is plotted on the “X” axis
 Severity increases from left to right
 NASA’s Methodology for Conduct of Space Shuttle Program 
Hazard Analysis (NSTS 22254) provides the following definition 
of Likelihood, or Probability of Occurrence
 Likelihood
 (a)  Probable:  Expected to happen in the life of the program…a single mission 
risk should have a mean probability greater than 1 in 200
 (b)  Infrequent:  Could happen in the life of the program.  Controls have 
significant limitations or uncertainties
 (c)  Remote:  Could happen in the life of the program, but not expected.  
Controls have minor limitations or uncertainties
 (d)  Improbable:  Extremely remote possibility that it will happen in the life of the 
program.  Strong controls in place.
 Likelihood is plotted on the “Y” axis
 Likelihood increases from bottom to top
 LEVEL OF CONTROL
 MIL-STD-882D has identified a set of mishap risk mitigation 
measures that identifies potential mishap risk mitigation 
alternatives and the expected effectiveness of each alternative or 
method. 
 a. Eliminate hazards through design selection.
 b. Incorporate safety devices.
 c. Provide warning devices.
 d. Develop procedures and training.
 LEVEL OF CONTROL
 A Modified Hazard Reduction Precedence Sequence has been 
developed and adds two additional levels of control.  They are:
 0. Eliminate risk through design.
 1. Substitute less risky materials for more hazardous materials.
 2. Install safety devices. 
 3. Install caution and warning devices.
 4. Develop administrative controls (to include special procedures 
and training.)
 5. Provide protective clothing and equipment
As you see, this Sequence gives a weight to each level of control; the 
weighting is inverted to provide a ‘tall-pole’ in following charts to 
indicate low-level controls ‘poking up’
Now let us see how these elements come together in
a traditional Risk Matrix
Now let us see how these elements come together in
a revised Risk Matrix that adds Level of Control
 Transfer the data from the table to a spreadsheet
 Set up a Sheet that will create a 3-D chart from the information
 Transfer the data from the table to a spreadsheet
 This is a traditional two-dimensional matrix
 Using the definitions for Likelihood, it is possible to identify the Level of Control, 
but it is not visible in this format
X X
X
X
X
 Transfer the data from the table to a Three-Dimensional 
spreadsheet
 The data quickly and visibly displays the three elements of Severity, Likelihood, 
and Level of Control
 This format permits easy recognition of the ‘tall-poles’ that may be the most 
likely candidates for additional controls
0
5
0
4
2
4 3
Likelihood
Le
ve
l o
f C
on
tr
ol
Severity
Hazardous Condition -
Low Pressure Vessel Ruptures
Marginal                             Critical                    Catastrophic
Probable
Infrequent
Remote
ImprobableCause a
Cause b
Cause e
Cause c Cause d
 Hazard Analyses are an important tool for Management
 Analyses should be able to answer these, and other, questions
 Is the design adequate for the needs?
 Is a redesign necessary, or prudent?
 What are the issues that must be overcome?
 What will it cost to fix the worst hazardous conditions?
 How solid are the controls that prevent the hazardous 
conditions?
 Is the project worthy of additional time, manpower, and 
expenditure?
 The Three-Dimensional Risk Matrix will provide visual 
answers to many of these questions.
